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The Ninth Circuit recently held that an individual, Mr. Uzi
Nissan, infringed the trademark of Nissan Motors when he
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registered and posted commercial content on
www.nissan.com. An injunction was granted, barring Mr. Uzi

>>

from using the site commercially. Although the trademark
dilution claim was remanded, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
favors a finding of dilution on remand. Additional arguments

Shidler Center

involving the property-right-in-gross theory of dilution,
reverse domain name hijacking, and actual consumer

UW School of Law

behavior on the Internet should be used by the parties to
bolster their cases and encourage a decision from the district
court that will advance trademark law on the Internet in a
reasoned and predictable fashion.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>

Point your browser to www.nissan.com 2 or

www.nissan.net3 and you’ll find the site of Nissan Motor Co.,
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the well known car company, right? Not so. Five years ago, you
would have found the site of Nissan Computer Corporation, a
small business in North Carolina owned by Mr. Uzi Nissan which
sold computers and related services. Today both Internet sites
have been barred from containing any commercial content
whatsoever, whether related to cars or not. The Ninth Circuit
held that Mr. Nissan’s use of the sites infringed on the Nissan
Motors name, but remanded the matter of trademark dilution to
the district court. 4 This decision demands scrutiny by both
individuals and companies using trademarks on the Internet
since it applies traditional rules of trademark law to the
Internet, continues a line of cases that expands the reach of
dilution, and yet leaves courts with little guidance on how to
apply the law. Offering additional arguments of trademark law
on remand, as discussed below, might help to resolve these
issues and provide future litigants with greater guidance.

BACKGROUND: PARTIAL RESOLUTION OF THE INITIAL DISPUTE
<2>

Mr. Uzi Nissan registered “nissan.com” in 1994 and

“nissan.net” in 1996 to support his two businesses, Nissan
Computer Corporation (“NCC”) and The Internet Center,
Inc. Although the primary purpose of these sites was to promote
sales of computers and computer services, in August 1999 Mr.
Nissan began selling space on nissan.com for third party
advertising. Some of this content contained automobile-related
ads. Two months later, Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. and Nissan North
America (collectively “Nissan Motor”) offered to purchase
nissan.com, but no agreement was reached.5
<3>

Nissan Motor filed suit in district court in December 1999.6

The original complaint asserted claims of trademark dilution in
violation of federal and state law; trademark
infringement; domain name piracy; false designation of
origin; and state law unfair competition.  In response, NCC
began posting commentary concerning the dispute in March
2000, including a link to www.ncchelp.org, 7 links to media
reports, and e-mail messages from people supporting Mr. Nissan
and decrying the lawsuit. In 2002, the district court granted the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on dilution,
infringement and cybersquatting, and issued its published
opinion on the injunction. The district court allowed NCC to
retain ownership of nissan.com and nissan.net, but permanently
enjoined the posting of any commercial or advertising content,
the posting of any commentary regarding Nissan Motor, and the
posting of any links to other sites containing either types of
content.
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<4>

Both sides appealed the district court’s decision. In June

2004, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the infringement judgment. The
court applied the well-known “Sleekcraft factors” of likelihood of
confusion, and found that auto-related advertising was infringing
but non-auto-related content was not.8 It reversed the
injunction however, and struck down Nissan Motor’s attempt to
silence negative commentary about the lawsuit since such an
injunction would constitute a content-based restriction on
speech in violation of the First Amendment. The dilution claim
was remanded because the record lacked sufficient facts
regarding the strength of the Nissan mark. 9

FINDING DILUTION: NOT A “DILUTE” THEORY AT ALL
<5>

Although the court was unable to issue a ruling on the

dilution claim, it took a clear position on the applicable law. It
relied heavily on two cases to construct its rule. First, from its
earlier decision in Avery Dennison v. Sumpton, it reiterated that
“injunctive relief is available under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act [FTDA] if a plaintiff can establish that (1) its mark
is famous; (2) the defendant is making commercial use of the
mark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use began after the
plaintiff’s mark became famous.”10 Second, the Court followed
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. by requiring the plaintiff to
show actual harm rather than likelihood of confusion to succeed
on a dilution claim. 11
<6>

In applying the first part of the rule, the Court noted that

“‘to be capable of being diluted, a mark must have a degree of
distinctiveness and ‘strength’ beyond that needed to serve as a
trademark.’” 12 In Avery Dennison, the Court emphasized that
dilution can be found for only those marks which have achieved
a threshold level of famousness or prominence. 13 Factors a
judge should use to determine whether a mark is famous
enough are provided in the FTDA and include the degree of
inherent or acquired distinctiveness, the channels of trade in
which it is used, and the degree of recognition in its trading
areas and channels. 14 In Nissan, however, the factual record
was clouded: Nissan Motor cited consumer surveys showing high
degrees of brand awareness, yet those surveys may have been
skewed; though Nissan Motors had registered the Nissan mark
in 1959 and used that name to market vehicles in the United
States since 1983, the same name has been used in other
commercial and even historic contexts. 15 Thus, the Court
emphasized the strong degree of protection dilution theory
affords, and the importance of applying it carefully. 16 On the
second part of the rule, the Court completely skipped any
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discussion of the Moseley requirement of showing actual harm,
and stated simply that it remands “to give the district court an
opportunity to consider [this matter] in the first instance.”17

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION FAVORS NISSAN MOTOR ON REMAND
<7>

Although the Ninth Circuit did not rule on the dilution claim,

several aspects of the Court’s opinion favor Nissan Motor on
remand.
<8>

First, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion relies on the “property-

right-in-gross” theory of dilution.18 This theory, proposed by
Professor Frank I. Schechter, posits that a famous mark “should
receive the same protection from the courts . . . [as does an]
investment in plant or materials.” 19 In effect, any commercial
mark that is “strong enough” to be protected from dilution
would be protected absolutely. This theory was adopted recently
in Moseley, the first trademark dilution case decided by the
Supreme Court, and is therefore the general rule.20 Although
the Ninth Circuit held up this strong form of trademark
protection, thus favoring Nissan Motor, it moderated its decision
somewhat by quoting from Avery Dennison that “‘[f]amousness
requires more than mere distinctiveness.’”21 Since the name
“Nissan” had been used in other commercial and even historical
contexts, the strength of Nissan Motor’s mark was sent back to
the district court for further assessment.
<9>

Questioning the strength of the Nissan mark does not

necessarily favor Mr. Nissan, however. The second factor
favoring Nissan Motor is the significantly less rigorous level of
analysis in Nissan than in Avery Dennison. The Avery Dennison
court considered four of the eight factors listed in 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(1), plus several additional factors in finding that Avery
Dennison failed to show the degree of secondary meaning
required for dilution.22 In particular, considering the “degree of
inherent or acquired distinctiveness,” Avery Dennison asserted
that a “long-standing principle of trademark law is the right of a
person to use his or her own name in connection with a
business.”23 The opinion also considered use of the marks by
third parties, and that both “Avery” and “Dennison” had been
used in numerous other commercial contexts. In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit in Nissan omitted these points and failed to
demand this same burden. Instead, it simply concluded “without
going into detail” that the record was “clouded” and a remand
was therefore needed. 24 This omission seems to favor Nissan
Motors on remand since it fails to demand a high level of
scrutiny regarding famousness or distinctiveness, in effect,
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giving Nissan Motors the benefit of the doubt.
<10>

A third factor favoring Nissan Motor comes from Moseley,

from which the Ninth Circuit borrows “‘direct evidence of dilution
such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution
can reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence—the
obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are
identical.’”25 Since Nissan involves a dispute over an identical
mark, this statement allows the lower court to presume dilution
without a strong factual showing otherwise.
<11>

In summary, although the Ninth Circuit remanded the

dilution claim, selected arguments from Avery Dennison and
Moseley seem to favor a finding on remand that NCC’s use of
“nissan.com” diluted the famous mark of Nissan Motor.

RESOLVING THE QUESTION: ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS TO CONSIDER
ON REMAND
<12>

Although the Ninth Circuit seems to favor Nissan Motor,

the question of dilution is far from over. The following sections
outline further influences on dilution law, and offer additional
arguments each party might use to bolster its case on remand.
<13>

Criticism of Schechter’s Dilution Theory: Serious concerns

have been raised over the now-adopted Schechter model of
trademark dilution.26 One commentator, Robert N. Klieger,
argues that the property-right-in-gross model upsets the
balance of two purposes of trademarks: first, to distinguish
products and facilitate informed consumer decisions, and second
to create consumer loyalty and barriers against competitors.27
Furthermore, as Klieger continues, Schechter’s theory
encourages overinvestment in a trademark to the point of
creating “intangible associations that add no real value” and
stifles new entrants in even unrelated markets. 28 Klieger also
explains that courts since the 1930s have been quick to adopt
Schechter’s overly protective dilution theory, often with little
analysis of their own: “courts continue to analyze dilution only
in conclusory terms and have plainly accepted the invitation of
trademark rights in gross for at least some categories of
marks.” 29 This trend will continue if the district court finds
dilution with no analysis beyond that offered by the Ninth
Circuit.
<14>

On remand, NCC might apply these economic arguments

and argue that since Nissan Motor is not in the computer
business it will not benefit from silencing Nissan Computer
Corporation any more than it would from silencing other
arguably diluting uses such as Nissan Thermos or Nissan Cup of
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Noodles. In favor of Nissan Motor, however, is the weight of
recent court rulings—most notably Moseley, which followed the
Schechter doctrine and failed to adopt Klieger’s arguments.30
Trademark owners, whether future litigants or not, may benefit
from a more thorough discussion of these arguments by the
district court.
<15>

Reverse Domain Name Hijacking: Trademark attorneys may

recognize Nissan as a classic case of reverse domain name
hijacking. Mr. Nissan certainly does. 31 A domain name
registrant is authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) to sue an
overreaching trademark owner if the original registrant’s domain
name has been suspended, disabled, or transferred. Few cases
have been heard on this theory at the time of this writing,
however, and none are directly on point. For example, the first
registrant of “Barcelona.com” was able to defend from having
the site transferred to the City Counsel of Barcelona, Spain. 32
The plaintiff won the case, however, because geographic names
such as “Barcelona” can obtain trademark protection only if they
acquire secondary meaning. Additional cases apply §
1114(2)(D)(v) as a way to remand a dispute to the lower court,
but fail to provide substantive rulings.33 It is important to note
that the use of a personal name will not defend NCC. A
trademark utilizing the name of another living person may only
be used for non-commercial purposes, and no court has yet held
that use on the Internet is any different.34
<16>

As applied to the Nissan dispute, reverse domain name

hijacking clearly favors NCC. It upholds the current first-come,
first-served system of domain name registration and encourages
a company wishing to use its trademark as a web address to
register that name early. One may reasonably question what
policies are served by reserving dilution protection for a
company like Nissan Motor, which failed to register “nissan.com”
and “nissan.net” before Mr. Nissan did. On the other hand,
reverse domain name hijacking is mentioned nowhere in the
Ninth Circuit opinion and perhaps need not be—previous cases
indicate that 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) is only appropriate as a
remedy against an administrative decision of the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), and not judicial
decisions. 35 Therefore, although reverse domain name hijacking
may currently be a remedy for improper “reverse hijacking”
decisions made by the UDRP, Mr. Nissan’s argument may be
misplaced before the courts. As with the property-in-gross
theory, Nissan has the potential to clarify in what instances
reverse domain name hijacking can be successfully invoked.
<17>

Actual Consumer Behavior on the Internet: The key
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question Nissan raises—and what the Ninth Circuit either
avoided or missed—is how consumers actually use the Internet
in commerce. Does “nissan.com” designate use in commerce, or
is it simply the online analog of a physical address? The Ninth
Circuit has answered this question in another case, holding that
“[r]egistration of a trademark as a domain name, without more,
is not a commercial use of the trademark.”36 Moreover, the
power of an Internet address to frustrate consumers in finding
the desired mark—and thus diluting the trademark—has been
questioned: “trademark law has always required reasonableness
on the part of consumers. . . . [W]hile the need to search for a
mark holder’s site [may be inconvenient,] this inconvenience [is]
not cognizable.” 37 Reasoning by analogy to Nissan, with the
widespread use of search engines, it is arguable how much a
slightly different internet address actually dilutes a trademark in
the mind of the consumer. Thus, the proper question may be
whether Nissan Motor has a right to use “nissan.com” rather
than “nissanusa.com” on the Internet any more than it has the
right to be located on Main Street rather than on Second
Avenue in the real world. This argument would almost certainly
favor NCC on remand, and would further compel a more
reasoned decision by the district court.

CONCLUSION
<18>

The Nissan decision is generating criticism among those

who think it goes too far in protecting large companies at the
expense of small companies and individuals who are first to use
a famous name on the Internet. Perhaps the only lesson from
Nissan we can be certain of is the old adage “come to equity
with clean hands.” It may be of little surprise that in this case,
both parties arrived at court a bit soiled. Nissan Motor shared a
name used in historic contexts, and failed to pursue other
commercial users of the name. Worse yet, it allowed Mr. Nissan
to register “nissan.com” first! On the other hand, Mr. Nissan
allowed arguably confusing auto-related content to appear on
his site. Then, in reaction to the initial lawsuit, he posted
disparaging commentary. Either party could have improved its
position by engaging in behavior that trademark law seeks to
promote. Absent that, it should be remembered that instances in
which David succeeds in slaying Goliath remain exceptional, not
routine.
<19>

The Nissan dispute stands as one of the early and very

influential cases on trademark dilution and related behavior on
the Internet. Both the commercial and Internet communities will
be looking to the district court for a well reasoned opinion in the
hopes that these policies continue to take shape in a predictable
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manner.

PRACTICE POINTERS
Trademark law tends to favor established companies
over smaller entities, even if the strength of the
mark is questionable. Therefore,
new entrants in a market should adopt a
very cautious approach to using marks
already established in other commercial
contexts, and
established companies should actively
enforce their mark against all potential
infringers.
Companies both large and small should realize that
the scope of trademark protection will be narrow if
multiple parties are using the same mark.
Reverse domain name hijacking, though codified, is
a new theory with little case precedent. Litigants
raising it outside of its exact stated application
should use it only as a supplemental claim in their
case.
As with other cases involving new technologies,
litigants should impress upon courts the way in
which these technologies are actually used in
practice. In the Nissan dispute, Internet search
engines figure heavily in online consumer
behavior. The use of search engines and other
aspects of actual online consumer behavior should
be raised in determining whether consumers are
confused or merely inconvenienced by similar
website addresses.
The Nissan outcome is unlikely to satisfy either party
since neither could use nissan.com for its intended
commercial purpose. This case sets an example of
when parties should settle out of court to achieve
better outcomes for both.
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